Why Chinese Strategists Perceive Minimal Differences Between the Two
In recent weeks, the dramatic shifts in the U.S. presidential election landscape have captured significant global interest. Before the summer even began, nations were already assessing the potential impacts of a possible return of former President Donald Trump to the White House or a second term for current President Joe Biden. For many countries, these scenarios represented vastly different prospects for global geopolitics and the future role of the United States on the world stage.
The situation took a startling turn during nine intense days in July, marked by Trump narrowly escaping an assassination attempt and Biden unexpectedly announcing he would not run for reelection. These events disrupted the U.S. presidential race and intensified uncertainties about America’s future direction. Many countries are now grappling with the prospect of either a continuation of Biden’s internationalist foreign policy under a potential President Kamala Harris or a shift toward a more isolationist stance under a reelected Trump and his running mate, J.D. Vance.
From China’s perspective, however, the situation appears less nuanced. Eight years ago, the first Trump administration marked the beginning of a more confrontational approach to U.S.-China relations, which left many Chinese observers perplexed. Instead of viewing China primarily as a trading partner or rival, the U.S. began to label it a “revisionist power,” a strategic competitor, and even a threat. Despite changes in rhetoric, the Biden administration has continued and even intensified this stance on some fronts. There seems to be a bipartisan consensus in Washington that regards China as a significant adversary, with an increasing number of analysts suggesting a framework reminiscent of a cold war.
To Chinese observers, the major U.S. political parties do not offer fundamentally different approaches toward China or the broader global order. Rather, they see both parties as reflecting a broader, recent trend in U.S. policy—a trend shaped more by domestic political dynamics than by differing strategies toward China. What is crucial for Chinese analysts is understanding the various strands of U.S. thinking on China and predicting which will prevail in practice. Most do not anticipate substantial shifts in U.S. policy towards China, but they are keenly observing which aspects of current U.S. discourse will ultimately shape future interactions.
Focusing on the Domestic Crowd
Given China’s political framework and the government’s tight control over public opinion, it can be challenging to gauge how Beijing’s leadership perceives and responds to U.S. discussions about China. However, some general observations can be made regarding the factors that many in China believe drive this debate.
Firstly, a country’s external behavior often mirrors its internal politics, a trend that seems particularly pronounced in the United States. Major domestic controversies can readily influence foreign policy, and this dynamic is especially evident in Washington’s approach to China.
For instance, Trump’s “America First” slogan and Biden’s “foreign policy for the middle class” clearly illustrate the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy in the U.S. When Trump assumed office, the polarized political environment significantly impacted his foreign policy decisions, especially regarding China. His “America First” agenda was largely a reaction to American voters’ anxieties about globalization and immigration. Consequently, the Trump administration implemented trade barriers, curtailed immigration, and reduced U.S. involvement in international organizations, focusing on enhancing the country’s economic interests and national security.
Biden’s foreign policy reflects comparable political concerns to those of Trump’s.
The Biden administration’s foreign policy, while aiming to align with domestic voter interests, mirrors some of the political considerations seen during Trump’s presidency. Biden’s approach seeks to address both domestic and international concerns, emphasizing the intersection between the prosperity of ordinary Americans and global issues. Like Trump’s “America First” policy, Biden’s strategy involves adjusting domestic industrial policies and international economic regulations to benefit U.S. interests. For instance, issues such as immigration and the fentanyl crisis illustrate how domestic challenges have international dimensions, influencing both border security and foreign relations.
China’s role in U.S. foreign policy has become increasingly prominent. While conflicts involving Russia and Israel capture significant attention, China remains a central focus of Washington’s global strategy. U.S. strategists are urging an accelerated pivot to Asia. In their book, Lost Decade, Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine argue that previous administrations—Obama’s, Trump’s, and Biden’s—have all struggled to formulate strong and coherent policies toward China and Asia. They assert that despite ongoing challenges in Europe and the Middle East, U.S. policymakers must prioritize a shift toward Asia.
This focus on China is evident in the U.S. presidential race, where both parties compete to present the toughest stance on Beijing. This underscores a significant aspect of the current American debate on China: the traditional distinction between “doves” and “hawks” does not fully capture the complexities of U.S. views on China. Given the bipartisan agreement on China as a major challenge, it is more relevant to explore the diverse policy perspectives emerging within this overarching consensus.
A Three-Sided Debate
The U.S. political landscape has been dominated by a complex and multifaceted debate involving China. As the presidential race unfolds, the discussion encompasses three distinct yet interconnected perspectives.
- Domestic Concerns Shaping Foreign Policy
Both the Biden and Trump administrations have demonstrated how domestic political considerations significantly shape U.S. foreign policy towards China. Biden’s foreign policy reflects a continuity of domestic focus, aiming to address voter concerns about economic and social issues while managing international relations. This includes rebalancing domestic industrial policies and international economic regulations to benefit U.S. interests. Similar to Trump’s “America First” policy, Biden’s approach emphasizes that U.S. prosperity and domestic well-being are deeply intertwined with global dynamics. Issues like immigration and the fentanyl crisis, which have both domestic and international implications, illustrate how domestic challenges influence foreign policy decisions and interactions with China.
- China’s Central Role in U.S. Strategy
China’s role has become increasingly pivotal in U.S. foreign policy. Despite other global conflicts, such as Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Israel’s conflict with Hamas, China remains a primary focus for Washington. Analysts, such as Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine in their book Lost Decade, argue that previous administrations have inadequately addressed the challenge posed by China. They advocate for a more decisive shift towards Asia, emphasizing that U.S. policymakers must enhance their strategies to effectively respond to China’s growing influence, despite ongoing issues in Europe and the Middle East.
- The Bipartisan Consensus and Policy Divergence
In the current U.S. political context, there is a broad bipartisan consensus on China as a major challenge. Both parties are engaged in a rhetorical competition to demonstrate their toughness towards Beijing. This consensus highlights a third dimension of the debate: the complexities of U.S. perceptions of China that go beyond traditional “dove” versus “hawk” categorizations. The debate reflects a range of policy perspectives within a general agreement on China’s significance, suggesting that understanding these varied viewpoints is crucial for grasping the full scope of U.S. policy toward China.
Together, these three perspectives—domestic influences on foreign policy, China’s central role in U.S. strategy, and the nuanced bipartisan consensus—shape the ongoing debate and reveal the intricate dynamics at play in U.S.-China relations.
Diverse Strategies, Shared Objectives
Americans might wonder whether China has a preference for a Harris administration or a second term for Trump, or more broadly, whether it favors Democrats or Republicans. This question echoes historical sentiments; for instance, in 1972, Chairman Mao Zedong expressed a preference for right-leaning Western leaders like President Richard Nixon, though he did not specify his reasons. Mao likely viewed Nixon and other right-leaning leaders as more focused on national economic and security interests, whereas left-leaning politicians might be seen as driven by ideology and political values.
Assessing whether Democrats or Republicans have had a greater impact on U.S.-China relations is challenging. For example, although it was Nixon, a Republican, who first initiated engagement with China, it was Democratic President Jimmy Carter who established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the U.S. has had an equal number of Democratic and Republican presidents, with significant developments and crises in bilateral relations occurring under both parties.
This uncertainty extends to current Chinese views of the two U.S. parties. When Trump assumed office in 2017, his primary concern regarding China was the large U.S. trade deficit, which, for the first time in history, was treated as a national security issue alongside China’s technological advancements. The Trump administration not only labeled China a “revisionist power” and a strategic competitor but also regarded the Chinese Communist Party as a threat to American values and “the free world.” Trump’s approach was aggressive and inconsistent, involving a broad “whole of government” strategy that aimed to compete with and confront China on nearly every front.
The Trump administration initiated its China policy with punitive tariffs on Chinese imports and broadened its efforts to include heightened scrutiny and restrictions on Chinese investments, stricter high-tech export controls, and targeted actions against major Chinese companies like Huawei. On security matters, the administration emphasized maintaining U.S. dominance in the “Indo-Pacific” region—a term that gained prominence under Trump. The administration also provided special security assurances to Taiwan, reduced adherence to the “one China” policy, invested in the Quad (a coalition of Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.) to counterbalance China, and intensified U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific to challenge China’s territorial claims.
Trump’s approach to the U.S.-China political relationship was not strictly ideological, but his administration and Congress were vocal in their criticism of China’s leadership and domestic policies, particularly regarding Xinjiang and Hong Kong. The broader “China threat” narrative adopted by Trump’s administration also significantly damaged longstanding academic, scientific, and cultural exchanges between the two countries. In multilateral diplomacy, Washington began to vilify Beijing and counter its international influence, attempting to limit China’s role in initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and its involvement in UN bodies.
The relationship further deteriorated in 2020 amidst a complex election year and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Trump administration blamed China for the pandemic, suspended most bilateral dialogues, and adopted a hostile posture. This included ordering the closure of China’s consulate in Houston in July 2020, accusing it of espionage and intellectual property theft.
Despite these confrontations, the Trump administration showed some flexibility towards China. It was open to trade negotiations and displayed a willingness to compromise on contentious issues such as technology and Taiwan. The “America First” stance also meant that Washington lacked the credibility and leverage needed to build a strong multilateral coalition against China. This contributed to a perception among some Chinese commentators that Trump was mainly interested in securing business deals with China. Notably, Trump visited Beijing in November 2017—a visit that Biden has yet to replicate—and signed a phase one trade agreement with China in January 2020 to address trade tensions. By the end of Trump’s presidency, his trade war with China was often viewed as unsuccessful by many in the United States.
Even with its imposition of punitive tariffs, the Trump administration was still receptive to engaging in trade discussions.
Despite the apparent differences from the Trump administration, the Biden administration has notably continued many of its predecessor’s policies toward China. Biden has reinforced the generally adversarial stance established during Trump’s tenure, but with a more systematic and multilateral strategy, described by his administration as “invest, align, and compete.” In his first foreign policy address in February 2021, Biden labeled China as the U.S.’s “most serious competitor” and committed to directly addressing the challenges it posed to American “prosperity, security, and democratic values.”
To enhance U.S. competitiveness and reduce dependency on China, Biden has worked closely with Congress on substantial infrastructure investments and industrial policies. The administration has also implemented stricter export controls, introduced new tariffs on Chinese green technology products, and fostered international collaborations like the Chip 4 alliance—a semiconductor partnership with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the United States—to advance technology competitiveness.
In the Asia-Pacific region, the Biden administration has increased military deployments in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea and added an economic dimension to U.S. security alliances in Asia. Biden has mobilized G-7 leaders to advance initiatives such as Build Back Better World and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In response to China’s strengthening ties with Russia amid the Ukraine conflict, the Biden administration has imposed sanctions on Chinese firms involved in trade with Russia. Additionally, the administration has framed the contest with China in ideological terms—“democracy versus autocracy”—to build a broad coalition against Beijing.
Even while maintaining a competitive stance, the Biden administration has kept regular high-level communication channels with China and sought areas for cooperation. It has also worked to depoliticize and restore bilateral academic and societal exchanges by ending the Trump-era China Initiative, which targeted researchers with connections to Chinese entities. Biden has held direct meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, including talks in Bali, Indonesia, in November 2022, and in San Francisco in November 2023, where both leaders agreed to sustain a stable and healthy bilateral relationship.
Large Investments or Broad Alliances
Chinese strategists have little expectation that U.S. policy toward China will shift significantly in the next decade. Given current public opinion trends and bipartisan consensus in Washington, they anticipate that whoever wins the November 2024 election will continue to emphasize strategic competition and containment in U.S.-China relations, with cooperation taking a back seat.
If Trump were to win a second term, he would likely adopt a more aggressive stance on trade with China. He has already suggested imposing a 60 percent tariff on all Chinese-made goods and revoking China’s permanent normal trade relations status, which has provided favorable trade terms since 2000. Trump has also proposed a “big yard, high fence” approach, expanding on the Biden administration’s “small yard, high fence” strategy, which focuses on protecting critical technologies with stringent security measures. This would aim for a broader technological decoupling from China.
Despite this, Trump’s tendency for dealmaking might lead him to seek bilateral agreements with Beijing on consumer goods, energy, and technology. He could use the Taiwan issue as leverage, possibly proposing to moderate Taiwan’s provocative actions in exchange for concessions from China on trade. However, such an arrangement might be unlikely to receive Beijing’s agreement, and Trump’s advisers could also oppose it. Trump’s preference for bilateral diplomacy over multilateral efforts might limit his ability to rally allies against China and could lead him to seek a separate accommodation with Russia, a close strategic ally of China.
In contrast, a Harris administration, if it continues the Biden administration’s policies, would likely intensify strategic competition with China and further solidify efforts to build a coalition of Western and Asian nations to counterbalance Beijing. Unlike Trump’s unpredictable approach, these strategies would likely be more organized and consistent.
Overall, from China’s perspective, both a new Trump administration and a Harris administration would likely pursue similar strategic objectives. Both candidates would present challenges for China, but neither appears inclined to seek major military conflict or completely sever economic and societal ties. Thus, Beijing is unlikely to have a strong preference. China has a vested interest in maintaining a stable relationship with the United States and avoiding major disruptions. Given the sensitivity of the election and U.S.-China relations, any attempt by China to interfere would likely backfire.
As the 2024 U.S. presidential race intensifies, Beijing has adopted a cautious stance, with officials describing the election as an “internal affair” of the U.S. At a July press briefing, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian emphasized that China “has never and will never interfere in U.S. presidential elections.” Lin also indicated that China opposes using China as an electoral issue and denounces misinformation that vilifies China. This suggests that while Beijing may respond rhetorically if attacked during the campaign, it remains committed to a principle of noninterference. Nonetheless, sensational and provocative comments from some Chinese-language media and external Chinese communities might not represent China’s official stance.
In 2024, both Washington and Beijing are primarily focused on their internal issues. While the U.S. is grappling with political polarization and a volatile election cycle, China remains politically stable and cohesive under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. In mid-July, the 20th CCP Central Committee concluded its third plenary session with a positive review of China’s economic recovery, despite disappointing growth figures for the first half of the year. The committee proposed comprehensive reforms to advance China’s modernization, emphasizing the need to balance economic development with national security. Beijing’s top priority is strengthening institutional foundations, particularly reinforcing CCP leadership and discipline.
Beijing understands that maintaining economic growth is crucial for domestic stability, and it is taking measured steps to enhance foreign trade, investment, and technological cooperation. It sees no benefit in antagonizing the United States and Western nations. However, the Chinese government is also vigilant against perceived Western, especially American, efforts to undermine its authority and legitimacy. It will not sacrifice political principles or national security for economic benefits.
While China seeks stable relations with Washington, it is preparing for potential turbulence. In March 2023, President Xi Jinping remarked on the extensive containment and suppression efforts by Western countries led by the U.S., describing these as severe challenges to China’s development. By May, at the inaugural meeting of the new Central National Security Committee, Xi urged the party to be ready for extreme scenarios and major challenges. Beijing continues to view global affairs through a lens of developing versus developed nations, rather than a Western versus anti-Western dichotomy.
China remains resolute in resisting U.S. interference in what it considers its internal matters, including issues related to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and human rights. Taiwan, in particular, is seen as a core issue, with China exercising significant restraint and not yet exhausting its policy options to prevent Taiwan’s de jure independence. The leadership remains committed to peaceful unification and the “one country, two systems” principle unless provoked. In territorial disputes, such as with the Philippines in the South China Sea, China’s approach is described as measured and confident. In trade and technology tensions with the U.S., China focuses on measured responses and self-reliance.
Given the similarities in the China policies of both Trump and Biden administrations, Beijing is approaching the outcome of the U.S. elections with caution and tempered expectations. In April, Xi reiterated to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken that China welcomes a confident and thriving United States and hopes for a positive view of China’s development. However, it seems unlikely that the next U.S. administration will view China favorably. As China prioritizes domestic development and security, it will aim to defend its economic and governance models while maintaining global trade and investment. Although deep cooperation akin to early twenty-first-century relations may be out of reach, China and the U.S. can still strive for stability and avoid major conflict, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office.